To distinguish
1. the sign that meets the requirements of denoting an object and calling an interpretant
from
2. the sign as the object that does the job
I ought to use representamen to indicate the signobject.

To consider a sign in itself is strictly speaking impossible, for we have in that case no way of dealing with the relations between a sign and the object(s) it stands for or the relations between a sign and the interpretant thought(s). In which case we drop the essence of the sign and look at it as if it were an object.

Still, if, for the sake of analysis, we disregard the relations between on the one hand signs and on the other hand their objects and their interpretant thoughts and we look at all the signs we have met as if they stood aloof, what can we say about them?

1. They have an internal structure or, in other words, they consist of combinations of qualities.
2. They have a factual existence, exist as individual entities.
3. They represent general rules of understanding, that is to say, they exist as special instances of rules or conventions.
See qualisign, sinsign and legisign.

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Since the concept of interpretant is derived from the concept of sign I will start with 2.

2 Relations sign - interpretant
What are the ways in which a sign may address an interpretant?

A sign may:
1. call into the mind an idea
2. state a relation between an idea and an object
3. raise an interpreting thought that acts like a conclusion out of premises.
See: Rhematic, propositional, argumentative.

1 the kinds of interpretants possible
1. a feeling produced by the sign
2. an effort of the body, of the mind or both
3. a mental sign; this sign even may be a habit (change)
See also emotional, energetic and logical interpretant.

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1. In our body as an impulse
2. In our mind
See mental and physical interpretant

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Since the concept of interpretant is derived from the concept of sign, I will start with 2.

2 relations between sign and object
There are three possible ways in which a sign may be connected to its objects.
1. The sign is connected with its object through a similarity between sign and object.
2. The sign may be physically connected with its object.
3. The sign may be connected to its objects by convention or a habit that grew.
See: iconic, indexical and symbolic.
1 the kinds of objects possible.
If we are confronted with a sign that states something about the world, then the sign itself presents an object that may be compared with the state of affairs in the world. This gives rise to a distinction between:
1. the object as presented by the sign
2. the object in the world that the sign aims at.
See immediate and dynamical object

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But this does not make the distinction less problematic.
For a rather difficult story about what may count as an object see my:

Objecten en contradicties
De jonge Peirce contra de jonge Wittgenstein.
See: http://www.semiotiek.nl/folder/theorie.html

Appeared in: Verslag van de vierde Toogdag Peirce. Broek in Waterland 31, May 1991

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But this does not make the distinction less problematic.
For a rather difficult story about what may count as an object see my:

Objecten en contradicties
De jonge Peirce contra de jonge Wittgenstein.
See: http://www.semiotiek.nl/folder/theorie.html

Appeared in: Verslag van de vierde Toogdag Peirce. Broek in Waterland 31, May 1991

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A legisign is a law or a rule that functions as a sign. We never meet legisigns 'direct'; they need a (replica) sinsign for their embodiment.

So a legisign is a general type that bestows significance to its instances. The words 'one', 'One' en '1' differ in some respects (shape, place). Still we know that we are dealing with the same word. This is due to the legisign character of the sign. Conventional signs for instance are legisigns.

Also known as 'type'.

See: Peirce: CP 2.246, 8.334, 8.335

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The sinsign aspect rules the factual existence of our signs. See also: replica sinsign.

Also known as token.

The aura of a unique work of art, before the advent of its easy technical reproducibility has its foundation in the sinsign character.

See also: Peirce: CP 2.245, 8.334, 8.334

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Colour impressions, sounds, tactile impressions, impressions of taste en smell, but always in their most elementary form, without composition.
See also: Peirce: CP 2.244, 8.334, 8.335

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A rhematic connection exists between sign and interpretant if the interpretant is nothing else then an idea called forth.
There is no relation with a particular object at a particular time and place.
There is no possibility to take a stance, as when we are dealing with a propositional relation.
And no reaction is asked for, like when we are dealing with an argumentative relation.
It is something like without reason uttering the sentence 'sheep with five legs' or inserting the SHELL mark.

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The connection between sign and interpretant is propositional if an idea is being raised and in addition the idea is connected with an object. But a reaction other than 'it is true' or 'it is false' is not asked for.

Examples:
Without any reason stating
"The first day of Christmas was a rainy day"
or
Without any reason presenting a trademark, for instance the NedTrain trademark, to someone.
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If a sign has an argumentative relation to its interpretant thought, then:
1. At least one idea is called up.
2. A relation is being established between idea and object in order to make a judgement possible.
3. A reaction is being asked for.

Always the argumentative relation involves several propositions. The propositions must be connected with each other in a correct way.

An informal example: A Nedtrain job opening in the Saturday newspaper to which the trademark of Nedtrain is attached.

The newspaper section in which the advertisement is placed together with picture mark, name and accompanying text must reinforce each other in such a way that a suitable candidate is going to react.

There are three main types of argument:
1. hypothesis
2. deduction
3. induction

Each of them has its own merits.

Design processes can be used to give a first rough impression of the different types of argument.

Usually they start with a briefing in which the commissioner formulates the aims. The designer uses them for inspiration and guidance and starts making sketches. Often two or three main lines of thought are pursued. This results in some proposals.
This is the hypothetical stage in which new ideas are generated.

The proposals will be discussed with the commissioner. In ideal circumstances the different proposals will be evaluated against the background of the briefing statements. The later function as general rules with which the specific proposals are matched. The proposal that is most true to the general statement will be chosen for further development.
This is the deductive stage in which the ideal conclusion is that a specific proposal is an instance of a general rule (the set of aims).

After finishing, let's say the trademark, the design is send into the world. This means that people are going to be confronted with instances of the design and instances of company behaviour. As a result interpretative habits are being generated.
This is the inductive stage.
This stage makes it possible for SHELL to drop the name out of its trademark.

If Pierce is right in his insistence on the triadic character of signs. A monadic, dyadic and triadic treatment must be possible. This scheme only gives the first two treatments. So a third treatment must be possible. The hypothesis is that this third treatment consists in a scheme that gives the conventions that rules the ways in which the interpretant follows:
1. conventions that rule the composition of signs and signscombinations
2. conventions that rule the ways in which the sign connects to the object, how does the sign communicate the reality it is connected to? See for instance Kress on modality markers.
3. conventions that rule signinterpretation

Proposed methods:
1 trying to incorporate the Kress/Leeuwen work. But also Eco has some good remarks.
2 investigation of professional designprocesses, i.e. processes in which signs are being generated (graphical work, new media).

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An iconic relation exists when the sign and object have characters in common. A not manipulated photograph is an example. But still a tricky one for the elements of photo and photographed reality do not correspond exactly, is not 1 to 1.
In a certain sense projection rules always play an important part in deciding how the icon is to be matched on reality.
A point stressed heavily by Eco.

For instance, take a car and compare:
1. drawing what you know,
2. drawing what you see,
3. drawing what you experience,
4. drawing at abstraction level x,
Etc.

see also designations

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A pure indexical relation exists between a sign and its object when they have a direct physical connection, like smoke and fire or the weathercock and the wind.

But as with iconic relation's conventions enter the game quickly. The pointer of a thermometer has a complicated and today logically mediated relation with the outside world.

An index is a sinsign that has an indexical relation with its object.

See also: replica index

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By far the most signs we encounter have a relation with their objects that is mediated by conventions. We are only able to make the connection because we learned rules.

Words have a symbolic relation with their objects. We learned what kind of object are designated by 'horse', 'table' and mind. But there are lots of other kinds of symbols. Take for example the Nike trademark. You can't tell by the wing that it is pointing to a business and calls forth at the same time the idea of victory.

Symbols can be iconic and/or indexical.

In languages like English a noun, like horse, is iconic. It aims at picturing objects. But also a complete story, for instance a metaphor, can be iconic.

Demonstratives are indexical, they point at objects without conveying any information about them, like the word 'there'.

In trademarks we often encounter the combination of a picture mark with a company name. The picture mark often expresses in a iconic way what we may expect from the company that is designated by the indexical name. See for example the NedTrain trademark.

But beware:
1. The name is typecast in a heavy type. This type is chosen in order to establish an iconic relation with the customary type in the branch that deals with heavy machinery.
2. A footprint in the sand has an iconic and an indexical relation with its object at the same time. It is an icon because the form of the foot is a special instance (replica sinsign) of a legisign, i.e. the foot form. It is an index because somebody walked the sand and left the impression (real sinsign).
(sinsign) karakter (het is een afdruk).

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Peirce: CP 8.334 Cross-Ref:††
or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I call it a sinsign (the syllable sin being the first syllable of semel, simul, singular, etc.);
Peirce: CP 8.335 Cross-Ref:††
Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the distribution of errors.
I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.)

Peirce: CP 2.95 Cross-Ref:††

Peirce: CP 4.538 Cross-Ref:††
though Argument would answer well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter.

Peirce: CP 2.276 Cross-Ref:††
276. An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.) Whether there are other kinds of substitutes or not we shall see. A Representamen by Firstness alone can only have a similar Object. Thus, a Sign by Contrast denotes its object only by virtue of a contrast, or Secondness, between two qualities. A sign by Firstness is an image of its object and, more strictly speaking, can only be an idea. For it must produce an Interpretant idea; and an external object excites an idea by a reaction upon the brain. But most strictly speaking, even an idea, except in the sense of a possibility, or Firstness, cannot be an Icon. A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and its object can only be a Firstness. But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon.
Peirce: CP 2.279 Cross-Ref:††
279. Turning now to the rhetorical evidence, it is a familiar fact that there are such representations as icons. Every picture (however conventional its method) is essentially a representation of that kind. So is every diagram, even although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object, but only an analogy between the relations of the parts of each. Particularly deserving of notice are icons in which the likeness is aided by conventional rules. Thus, an algebraic formula is an icon, rendered such by the rules of commutation, association, and distribution of the symbols. It may seem at first glance that it is an arbitrary classification to call an algebraic expression an icon; that it might as well, or better, be regarded as a compound conventional sign. But it is not so. For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction. Thus, by means of two photographs a map can be drawn, etc. Given a conventional or other general sign of an object, to deduce any other truth than that which it explicitly signifies, it is necessary, in all cases, to replace that sign by an icon. This capacity of revealing unexpected truth is precisely that wherein the utility of algebraical formulae consists, so that the iconic character is the prevailing one.
Peirce: CP 2.778 Cross-Ref:††
We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination. If visual, it will either be geometrical, that is, such that familiar spatial relations stand for the relations asserted in the premisses, or it will be algebraical, where the relations are expressed by objects which are imagined to be subject to certain rules, whether conventional or experiential. This diagram, which has been constructed to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same relations which are abstractly expressed in the premisses, is then observed, and a hypothesis suggests itself that there is a certain relation between some of its parts--or perhaps this hypothesis had already been suggested. In order to test this, various experiments are made upon the diagram, which is changed in various ways. This is a proceeding extremely similar to induction, from which, however, it differs widely, in that it does not deal with a course of experience, but with whether or not a certain state of things can be imagined. Now, since it is part of the hypothesis that only a very limited kind of condition can affect the result, the necessary experimentation can be very quickly completed; and it is seen that the conclusion is compelled to be true by the conditions of the construction of the diagram. This is called "diagrammatic, or schematic, reasoning."
Peirce: CP 2.314 Cross-Ref:††
314. Our definition forbids an Icon to be a Dicisign, since the proper Interpretant of an Icon cannot represent it to be an Index, the Index being essentially more complicated than the Icon. There ought, therefore, to be no informational signs among Icons. We find that, in fact, Icons may be of the greatest service in obtaining information--in geometry, for example--but still, it is true that an Icon cannot, of itself, convey information, since its Object is whatever there may be which is like the Icon, and is its Object in the measure in which it is like the Icon.
Peirce: CP 3.362 Cross-Ref:††
362. The third case is where the dual relation between the sign and its object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance between them. I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream -- not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon.

Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:††
I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C.

Peirce: CP 2.92 Cross-Ref:††
92. Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to be subject to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually exist. A being in futuro will suffice.

CP 2.230. The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the "ratio," or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.)

Peirce: CP 8.334 Cross-Ref:††
or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a legisign. As we use the term 'word' in most cases, saying that 'the' is one 'word' and 'an' is a second 'word,' a 'word' is a legisign
Peirce: CP 8.335 Cross-Ref:††
Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol.

Peirce: CP 2.286 Cross-Ref:††
286. . . . A low barometer with a moist air is an index of rain; that is we suppose that the forces of nature establish a probable connection between the low barometer with moist air and coming rain. A weathercock is an index of the direction of the wind; because in the first place it really takes the self-same direction as the wind, so that there is a real connection between them, and in the second place we are so constituted that when we see a weathercock pointing in a certain direction it draws our attention to that direction, and when we see the weathercock veering with the wind, we are forced by the law of mind to think that direction is connected with the wind. The pole star is an index, or pointing finger, to show us which way is north. A spirit-level, or a plumb bob, is an index of the vertical direction. A yard-stick might seem, at first sight, to be an icon of a yard; and so it would be, if it were merely intended to show a yard as near as it can be seen and estimated to be a yard. But the very purpose of a yard-stick is to show a yard nearer than it can be estimated by its appearance. This it does in consequence of an accurate mechanical comparison made with the bar in London called the yard. Thus it is a real connection which gives the yard-stick its value as a representamen; and thus it is an index, not a mere icon.

Peirce: CP 8.368 Fn 23 p 241
†23 (Ed.) "An index represents an object by virtue of its connection with it. It makes no difference whether the connection is natural, or artificial, or merely mental. There is, however, an important distinction between two classes of indices. Namely, some merely stand for things or individual quasi-things with which the interpreting mind is already acquainted, while others may be used to ascertain facts. Of the former class, which may be termed designations, personal, demonstrative, and relative pronouns, proper names, the letters attached to a geometrical figure, and the ordinary letters of algebra are examples. They act to force the attention to the thing intended. Designations are absolutely indispensable both to communication and to thought. No assertion has any meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of reality or what universe of fiction is referred to. The other class of indices may be called reagents. Thus water placed in a vessel with a shaving of camphor thrown upon it will show whether the vessel is clean or not. If I say that I live two and a half miles from Milford, I mean that a rigid bar that would just reach from one line to another upon a certain bar in Westminster, might be successively laid down on the road from my house to Milford, 13200 times, and so laid down on my reader's road would give him a knowledge of the distance between my house and Milford. Thus, the expression "two miles and a half" is, not exactly a reagent, but a description of a reagent. A scream for help is not only intended to force upon the mind the knowledge that help is wanted, but also to force the will to accord it. It is, therefore, a reagent used rhetorically. Just as a designation can denote nothing unless the interpreting mind is already acquainted with the thing it denotes, so a reagent can indicate nothing unless the mind is already acquainted with its connection with the phenomenon it indicates." From "Notes on Topical Geometry," undated, Widener IA-2.

Peirce: CP 2.299 Cross-Ref:††
299. A regular progression of one, two, three may be remarked in the three orders of signs, Icon, Index, Symbol. The Icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents; it simply happens that its qualities resemble those of that object, and excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness. But it really stands unconnected with them. The index is physically connected with its object; they make an organic pair, but the interpreting mind has nothing to do with this connection, except remarking it, after it is established. The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist.

In advance of ascertaining the nature of this [further, auke] effect, it will be convenient to adopt a
designation for it, and I will call it the logical interpretant, without as yet determining whether this term shall extend to anything beside the meaning of a general concept, though certainly closely related to that, or not. Shall we say that this effect may be a thought, that is to say, a mental sign? No doubt, it may be so; only, if this sign be of an intellectual kind -- as it would have to be -- it must itself have a logical interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant of the concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-change; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person's tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause. It excludes natural dispositions, as the term "habit" does, when it is accurately used; but it includes beside associations, what may be called "transsociations," or alterations of association, and even includes dissociation, which has usually been looked upon by psychologists (I believe mistakenly), as of deeply contrary nature to association.

Auke
Op dit zinsanalyse niveau overigens nog onvervuld. Het is a.h.w. de conclusie uit de zinnen 1 en 2:
1 vraag: welk weer is het vandaag
2 antwoord: het is een stormachtige dag
3 conclusie: dan ga ik dit en/of dat doen.

The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings.

If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a single act (sinsign, auke), [while] such a concept is of a general nature(legisign, auke). But what further kind of effect can there be?